Seven blunders of India

NATIONAL SECURITY
bungling leadership

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 Seven blunders of IndiaThe squandering of hard-won military victories, good faith bordering on naivete, and political compulsions have enfeebled India
by MAJOR GENERAL MRINAL SUMAN
HISTORICAL mistakes, because they cannot be undone, have a complex snowballing effect on a nation’s future. The following historical blunders, recounted chronologically, changed the course of independent India’s history and cast a shadow over its future. Instances of the inadequacy of India’s decision-making apparatus and the leadership’s lack of vision, they will haunt India for generations.

The Kashmir MessTHERE can be no better example of shooting oneself in the foot than the clumsy handling of the Kashmir issue. In 1947, Hari Singh was the reigning monarch of Jammu and Kashmir. Vacillating on the decision to join the Indian Dominion, he faced an invasion by tribal marauders backed by the Pakistani Army in October of that year. He sought help from New Delhi and agreed to accede to India. Indian forces then blunted the invasion and re-conquered vast areas. First, India erred by not insisting on unequivocal accession and granting special status through Article 380 of the Constitution. Second, on the verge of evicting all invaders and recapturing the entire state, India halted operations on January 1, 1949 and appealed to the Security Council. It is the only case in history when a nation on the threshold of complete victory has voluntarily forsaken it in the misplaced hope of winning the admiration of the global community. Third, the Indian leadership made an unconstitutional offer of plebiscite in the UN.
India and Pakistan have since had wars and skirmishes with no solution in sight. Worse, the local politicians are holding India to ransom by playing the Pakistan card.

Ignoring the Chinese Threat and Neglecting the Military
MEMORIES of 1962 will always trouble the Indian psyche. A nation of India’s size had lulled itself into believing that its protestations and platitudes of peaceful coexistence would be reciprocated by the world. Its armed forces were neglected, the intelligence apparatus was rusted and foreign policy was in a shambles. Signs of China’s aggressive intentions were discernible for years but the Indian leadership fondly hoped the problem would resolve itself. When China struck, India was caught unprepared. Troops were rushed to snowbound areas with summer clothing and outdated rifles. Despite numerous sagas of gallantry, the nationwas forced on its knees.

The Tashkent Agreement and Return of Haji Pir PassFOLLOWING the ceasefire after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, a Russia-sponsored agreement was signed between India and Pakistan in Tashkent on January 10, 1966. India agreed to return the strategic Haji Pir pass to Pakistan which it had captured in August 1965 at huge human cost. The pass connects Poonch and Uri sectors in Jammu and Kashmir via a route of 15 km whereas the alternative entails travelling over 200 km. India got nothing in return except an undertaking by Pakistan to abjure war, which meant little since Pakistan had no intention of honouring it. In addition to the loss of a direct Poonch-Uri link, the pass is being used by Pakistan to infiltrate terrorists into India. The inability to resist Russian pressure was a manifestation of the shortcomings of Indian foreign policy and leadership.

The Simla AgreementWITH the fall of Dhaka on December 16, 1971, India had scored a decisive victory over Pakistan. Over 96,000 Pakistani soldiers were taken prisoner. An agreement was signed between the two countries on July 2, 1972, at Shimla (then Simla). Both countries agreed to exchange all PoWs, respect the line of control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir, and refrain from use of threat or force. Additionally, Pakistani PM ZA Bhutto gave a solemn verbal undertaking to accept the LoC as the de facto border. India released all the PoWs but Pakistan returned only 617 Indian PoWs and 54 are still languishing in Pakistani jails. India failed to use the 96,000 Pakistani PoWs to discipline Pakistan. Again, Pakistan never intended to abide by its promises, written or verbal. The fruits of a hard-won victory on the battlefield were frittered away at the negotiating table.

The Nuclear Muddle
SUBSEQUENT to China’s nuclear test at Lop Nor in 1964, India showed rare courage in carrying out its first explosion on May 18, 1974, at Pokharan. Besides the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, India was the only nation to prove its nuclear capability. But ecstatic Indians had not contended with their government’s penchant for squandering hard-earned gains. Instead of asserting its status as a nuclear power and demanding recognition, India turned apologetic and tried to convince the world that it had no nuclear ambitions. Strangely, it termed the Pokharan test a “peaceful nuclear explosion” – a term unheard-of till then. Criticism and sanctions were expected and must have been factored in beforehand. A few assertive follow-on tests would have forced the world to accept India as a member of the nuclear club but India self-imposed a moratorium on further testing. India lost the advantages provided by its scientists. It suffered sanctions and also failed to gain recognition as a nuclear power.

The Kandahar Hijack
THE hijacking of an Indian Airlines aircraft to Kandahar by Pakistani terrorists in December 1999 will rile Indians for long. The eight-day ordeal ended when the National Security Adviser announced the release of the three Kashmiri militants, including Maulana Masood Azhar, demanded in return for the hostages. Sadly, the Prime Minister claimed credit for forcing the hijackers’ climbdown on their demands. Worse, the External Affairs Minister accompanied the released militants to Kandahar as if seeing off guests. Poor crisis-management skills and complacency in security matters allowed the hijackers to take off from Amritsar airport after a 39-minute halt for refuelling, thereby letting the situation out of control. India’s vaunted decision-making apparatus was paralysed by a bunch of motivated fanatics. India earned the tag of a soft nation which will be very difficult to shed.

Illegal Immigration and Passage of IMDT ActIT is standard practice all over the world for the burden of proving bona fide citizenship to fall on the accused. It is the same in India under the Foreigners Act of 1946 but political expediency forced an exception to be made for Assam. In a shortsighted move, the Illegal Migrants – Determination by Tribunals (IMDT) Act of 1984 was passed for Assam. It shifted the onus of proving the illegal status of a suspected immigrant to the accuser, which is virtually impossible. Whenever repeal of the Act was sought, the Congress, Left Front and United Minorities Front resisted it. Worse, any protest against the Act was dubbed “anti-minority”, imparting a communal colour to a national security issue. The government’s “pardon” of all Bangladeshis who had entered before 1985 was another unconstitutional act that aggravated the problem. On July 13, 2005, more than 20 years after enactment, the Act was struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. But immense damage had already been done to the demography of Assam and the local people had been reduced to minority status in certain districts. No party can hope to come to power without the support of illegal immigrants. About 30 Islamic groups are thriving in the area to further Islamist and pan-Bangladesh agenda.

Is India Wiser Today? Two features are common to all these blunders. First, the decisions were taken by the political leadership and the bureaucracy. The military leadership was neither taken into confidence nor consulted. It was deliberately kept out of the decision-making loop. Second, no political leader or bureaucrat was ever held accountable for their blunders. On the contrary, every bureaucrat involved made it to the higher grades and even secured lucrative post-retirement appointments. Today, they masquerade as foreign policy experts on TV. India has learnt no lessons. The military leadership is still kept out of the decision-making apparatus.